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Bitka za Amiens, 8. kolovoza-3. rujna 1918

Bitka za Amiens, 8. kolovoza-3. rujna 1918


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Bitka za Amiens, 8. kolovoza-3. rujna 1918

Bitka kod Amiensa, 8. kolovoza-3. rujna 1918., često se smatra prekretnicom na Zapadnom frontu (Prvi svjetski rat). Prvom polovicom godine dominirale su njemačke ofenzive, počevši od druge bitke na Sommi (21. ožujka-4. travnja 1918.), koja je Britance potjerala natrag gotovo do periferije Amiensa, stvarajući veliki udar u saveznicima linije.

Saveznički protuudar započeo je tijekom druge bitke na Marni (15. srpnja-5. kolovoza 1918.). To je dovelo do neuspjeha konačne njemačke ofenzive i francusko-američkog protunapada (ofenziva Aisne-Marne, 18. srpnja-5. kolovoza) koji je Nijemce potisnuo s istaknutog mjesta Château-Thierry. Dana 24. srpnja, dok je ova bitka trajala, saveznički vrhovni zapovjednici sastali su se u Bombonu kako bi odlučili što dalje učiniti. Opća pretpostavka bila je da će se rat nastaviti do 1919., ali Foch je planirao niz protunapada za 1918. Početni je cilj bio istisnuti Nijemce iz triju neugodnih klijenata, u St. Mihielu, Château-Thierryju i Amiensu. Ako bi ti napadi prošli dobro, uslijedila bi opća ofenziva.

Britanski doprinos ovom planu bila je bitka kod Amiensa. Još prije sastanka u Bombonu, Haig je uputio generala Rawlinsona, koji je zapovijedao Četvrtom armijom oko Amiensa, da se pripremi za napad na istaknutu stranu. Rawlinson je razvio plan za tenkovsku bitku. Rawlinson je imao višenacionalnu vojsku, s američkim, australskim, kanadskim i britanskim divizijama. Dobio je 530 britanskih i 70 francuskih tenkova, od čega 96 tenkova za opskrbu, 22 nosača oružja i 420 borbenih tenkova, uključujući 324 marke Mark vs. Za potrebe napada Amiens Haig je također dobio kontrolu nad prvom francuskom armijom (Debeny), desno od britanskog položaja. Osam francuskih divizija sudjelovalo bi u napadu na Amiens.

Ključ Rawlinsonovog plana bilo je iznenađenje. Planirao je napad od deset divizija protiv fronta od 10 milja (s Kanađanima i Australcima koji čine većinu pješaštva). Bitno je bilo da Nijemci nisu posumnjali što se sprema-dobro tempirano njemačko protu bombardiranje moglo je nanijeti ogromne žrtve britanskom napadu. U skladu s tim, Rawlinson je planirao napad bez ikakvog prethodnog topničkog bombardiranja. Napad bi započeo tenkovima, podržanim pješaštvom i zaštićenim puzajućom baražom. Topništvo bi otvorilo vatru istodobno s tenkovskim napredovanjem. Desno francuskoj prvoj armiji nedostajalo je tenkova. Kako bi sačuvali iznenađenje, Francuzi bi započeli topničko bombardiranje u isto vrijeme kad i britanski napad, a zatim bi pješaštvo nastavili 45 minuta kasnije.

Njemačku liniju branilo je dvadeset umornih divizija iz Osamnaeste armije (von Hutier) i Druge armije (Marwitz). U četiri mjeseca otkako su zauzeli istaknuto mjesto, Nijemci su stvorili snažan obrambeni sustav. Prema Ludendorffu, „divizijske fronte bile su uske, topništvo je bilo u izobilju, a sustav rovova bio je dubinski organiziran. Radilo se na svom iskustvu stečenom 18. srpnja ”.

Napad je počeo 8. kolovoza. U prvih nekoliko sati bitke srušilo se šest njemačkih divizija. Cijele jedinice počele su se predavati. Ludendorff je 8. kolovoza nazvao “Crnim danom njemačke vojske”. Do kraja dana saveznici su napredovali devet milja preko cijele deset milja fronte. Tijekom prvog dana odvedeno je 16.000 zatvorenika.

Prva faza bitke završila je 11. kolovoza. Nijemci su se povukli na linije koje su držali prije prve bitke na Sommi. Haig je smatrao da su ove linije prejake za napad bez odgovarajućeg topničkog bombardiranja - staro ratište Somme bilo je pustoš od kratera granata neprikladnih za tenkovsko ratovanje.

Umjesto toga, Haig je pokrenuo drugi napad sjevernije, koristeći Treću armiju (Byng) i dio Prve armije (Horne). Svrha ovog napada, poznatog kao bitka kod Bapaumea, bila je prisiliti Nijemce natrag na liniju Somme. Ovaj napad počeo je 21. kolovoza. Nakon što su 22. kolovoza ispratili njemački protunapad, britansko napredovanje prisililo je Nijemce da se povuku na Somme. Napad se proširio na prvu i četvrtu armiju, dok su Francuzi nastavili s vlastitim napadom južnije.

Nijemci su 26. kolovoza održali novu liniju koja je išla uz Somme južno od Péronnea, zatim preko otvorenih područja do Noyona na Oiseu. Novozelanđani su 29. kolovoza zauzeli Bapaume, u središtu ove linije. Sljedeći su iskorak napravili Australci koji su se u noći s 30. na 31. kolovoza izborili put preko Somme i zauzeli Péronne. Konačno, 2. rujna Kanadski korpus, boreći se s Prvom armijom, probio je prekidač Drocourt-Quéant, jugoistočno od Arrasa. Ti su proboji prisilili Nijemce da napuste liniju Somme i povuku se sve do linije Hindenburg.

Neočekivani opseg uspjeha britanske vojske i vojske Commonwealtha u Amiensu i Bapaumeu potaknuo je Focha da planira masovnu trostruku ofenzivu za kraj rujna, s namjerom da probije liniju Hindenburg i natjera Nijemce iz Francuske (ofenziva Meuse-Argonne, bitka za Flandriju i bitka za Cambrai-St. Quentin).

Nijemci su pretrpjeli vrlo velike gubitke tijekom bitke kod Amiensa. Britanci i Francuzi zarobili su 33 000 zatvorenika i nanijeli između 50 000 i 70 000 žrtava Nijemcima. Britanci su izgubili 22.000 ljudi, Francuzi 20.000. Velika trojna ofenziva postigla bi svoj glavni cilj i pokrenula eventualni njemački kolaps, ali po mnogo višoj cijeni.

Knjige o Prvom svjetskom ratu | Predmetni indeks: Prvi svjetski rat


Bitke na Sommi 1918: Saveznička ljetna ofenziva

Druge bitke na Sommi 1918. vodile su se u ljeto te godine, nakon njemačke proljetne ofenzive operacije Michael. Ljetna saveznička ofenziva otvorena je bitkom za Amiens 8. kolovoza. Francuska vojska napala je u isto vrijeme južno od rijeke Somme u bitci za Montdidier. Uključeno je deset savezničkih divizija, uključujući australske i kanadske snage koje služe s britanskom Četvrtom armijom. Savezničke snage iznenadile su Nijemce prvog dana 8. kolovoza i brzo napredovale prema istoku od nekoliko milja, usput odvevši stotine njemačkih zarobljenika. Značajnim napretkom vraćen je veći dio tla koje su saveznici izgubili u ožujku, početkom godine. Ova je bitka označila kraj zastoja u rovovskom ratu na Zapadnom frontu, učinkovite kombinacije pješaštva, zračne potpore i tenkova. Bio je to početak nekoliko bitaka od kolovoza do studenog 1918., koje su postale poznate kao Stoodnevna ofenziva. Saveznički uspjeh 8. kolovoza bio je crni dan za njemačku vojsku.

Treća britanska armija i Drugi korpus Sjedinjenih Država pokrenuli su napad kako bi ponovno zauzeli Alberta 21. kolovoza. Grad Albert ponovno je zauzet 22., a grad Bapaume zauzet je 29. kolovoza.

Uspjeh bitke kod Amiensa nastavio se drugom bitkom kod Bapaumea od 21. kolovoza. Britanska Treća armija i Drugi korpus Sjedinjenih Država pokrenuli su napad. Grad Albert ponovno je zauzet 22., a grad Bapaume zauzet je 29. kolovoza.

Tijekom noći 30./31. Kolovoza trupe australske 2. divizije prešle su močvarno tlo i rijeku Somme kako bi se probile uz padinu do uzvisine Mont St. Quentin. Položaj koji su držali Nijemci na ovom brdu nadgledao je grad P & eacuteronne i pružio Nijemcima dobru vidikovac nad bilo kojim savezničkim napadom na bijelom danu. Uspješno zauzevši vrh brda, Australci su ponovno odgurnuti s njega kad su stigle njemačke rezerve da zauzmu položaj. Sljedećeg dana, međutim, Australci su uspjeli potpuno odgurnuti Nijemce s brda i konačno je bilo pod savezničkom kontrolom. Grad P & eacuteronne zauzet je 1. rujna. Uključene australske jedinice pretrpjele su velike žrtve, ali su postigle veliki uspjeh u zauzimanju položaja, što je rezultiralo početkom njemačkog povlačenja na istok.


Od Amiensa do primirja: Sto dana uvredljivo

Ofanziva Sto dana, poznata i kao Napredak u pobjedu, bila je niz savezničkih uspjeha koji su njemačku vojsku vratili na ratišta 1914.

Njemačka proljetna ofenziva bila je blizu probijanja savezničke bojišnice, ali uspjeli su se zadržati. U Drugoj bitci na Marni (15. srpnja-6. kolovoza) Nijemci još jednom nisu uspjeli zadati odlučujući udarac te su ih 18. srpnja saveznički protunapad, predvođen Francuzima, ponovno odgurnuo. Marne je trebala biti posljednja njemačka ofenziva. Saveznici su sada preuzeli inicijativu.

Suradnja je bila značajan faktor u uspjehu ofenzive. General Ferdinand Foch imenovan je vrhovnim zapovjednikom savezničkih snaga na Zapadnoj fronti u ožujku 1918. On je upravljao cjelokupnom strategijom koja je osigurala koordiniran pristup francuske, britanske i američke vojske.

Saveznici Kontrolirajte nebo

Saveznici Kontrolirajte nebo

Ofanziva Sto dana trajala je 95 dana, počevši od bitke kod Amiensa 8. kolovoza 1918. i završivši primirjem 11. studenog 1918. godine.

Do ljeta 1918. saveznici su imali kontrolu nad nebom. Britanski, francuski i američki zrakoplovi ponekad su nadmašivali svoje njemačke kolege pet prema jedan. Njihova dominacija u zraku omogućila je saveznicima fotografiranje njemačkih položaja i usmjeravanje njihove topničke vatre iz zrakoplova, kao i sprječavanje Nijemaca da učine isto. To je saveznicima omogućilo da prikriju svoje pripreme i zadrže njemačku vojsku u nagađanju odakle će doći sljedeći napad.

The Bitka kod Amiensa Počinje

The Bitka kod Amiensa Počinje

U 4.20 sati 8. kolovoza 1918. započela je bitka za Amiens. Bilo je jutro jake magle i Nijemce je potpuno zateklo. Neki njemački časnici navodno su zarobljeni dok su još doručkovali! Australski i Kanadski korpus predvodili su napad i brzo napredovali iza 534 tenka, postigavši ​​svoje ciljeve u roku od nekoliko sati.

Kad je napredovanje zaustavljeno 11. kolovoza, saveznici su prebacili svoj napad na drugi dio crte. Ova nova strategija pridonijela je uspjehu ofenzive kontinuiranim rastezanjem resursa i ljudstva njemačke vojske. Saveznici su nastavili napadati na ovaj način cijelo ljeto i jesen 1918. dajući sve iscrpljenijoj i iscrpljenoj njemačkoj vojsci malo predaha.

Do kraja kolovoza saveznici su tijekom druge bitke na Sommi zauzeli Albert, Bapaume, Noyon i Peronne.

Amerikanci

Amerikanci

Do kraja kolovoza u Francuskoj je bilo preko 1,4 milijuna američkih vojnika. Dolazak ovih svježih postrojbi omogućio je saveznicima da nastave borbu nakon značajnih gubitaka tijekom njemačke proljetne ofenzive.

Napad na istaknuti St Mihiel (12.-15. Rujna) bio je prvi i jedini američki napad tijekom Prvog svjetskog rata. To je bila relativno laka pobjeda jer je njemačku vojsku uhvatila na povlačenju, ali je uspostavila američku vojsku kao strašnu borbenu snagu.

Uspjehom u St Mihielu Amerikanci su bili potaknuti da podrže ambiciozni napad koji je maršal Foch planirao u bitkama za Meuse-Argonne. To je bio glavni doprinos američke vojske u Prvom svjetskom ratu, a gubici su bili veliki među njihovim neiskusnim postrojbama.

U Otvorena

U Otvorena

Savezničke vojske su primijenile novu taktiku za prevladavanje zastoja u rovovskom ratu. Topništvo, tenkovi i zračna snaga uspješno su korišteni u novom koordiniranom pristupu naoružanju. Saveznički uspjeh vidio je borbu koja se iz rovova izlazi na otvoreno.

Savezničko topništvo dominiralo je na bojnom polju otvarajući put za proboj. Međutim, njemački mitraljezi ometali su njihov napredak pa je većina napada izvedena pod okriljem mraka.

Tenkovi su još uvijek bili relativno novo oružje i bili su najkorisniji za razbijanje prepreka od bodljikave žice, uništavanje mitraljeskih stupova i u borbama na selu. Za njima bi slijedile male skupine pješaka. Nosili su jaslice, okvire od drveta i čelika, koji su se mogli ispustiti kako bi mogli prijeći široke rovove.

Ubrzano kretanje uzrokovalo je poteškoće u nabavci zaliha na frontu, a mali broj vojnika koji su bili na terenu 1918. prošli su obuku za otvoreno ratovanje.

The Hindenburgova linija

The Hindenburgova linija

Do kraja rujna savezničke snage bile su suočene s linijom Hindenburg, nizom jako utvrđenih položaja koji su činili glavnu njemačku obranu.

Bitka na kanalu St Quentin (29. rujna 1918.) bila je ključna pobjeda koja je probila jedan od najjačih dijelova linije Hindenburg. Nakon potpunog proboja linije početkom listopada, izvještava se da je general Ludendorff rekao da "situacija [njemačke] vojske zahtijeva hitno primirje kako bi se spasila katastrofa".

Iako će do primirja proći još nekoliko tjedana, bilo je jasno da Njemačka sada ne može dobiti rat.

The 'Crni dan njemačke vojske'

The 'Crni dan njemačke vojske'

Tijekom cijele Stodnevne ofenzive, loš moral njemačke vojske značajno je pridonio savezničkim pobjedama. Neuspjeh proljetne ofenzive i iznenadni protunapad na Amiens demoralizirali su njemačke trupe. Oko 30.000 njemačkih vojnika predalo se tijekom bitke za Amiens. Ludendorff je opisao prvi dan ove bitke kao "crni dan njemačke vojske". Ogroman broj njemačkih zarobljenika također je odveden u bitci kod kanala St. Quentin. Samo 46. divizija zarobila je preko 4000 ljudi. General Sir Henry Rawlinson primijetio je da bi linija Hindenburg bila neosvojiva da ju je dvije godine ranije branila njemačka vojska.

Kanadski korpus Doseže Mons

Kanadski korpus Doseže Mons

Kanadski korpus stigao je do Monsa 11. studenog 1918. u 4 sata ujutro. Okružili su ih veseli civili dok su marširali ulicama. Mons je bio mjesto prve bitke koju je britanska vojska vodila u kolovozu 1914., a za vrijeme rata okupirali su ga Nijemci.

Borbe na Zapadnom frontu nastavile su se do posljednje minute sve dok konačno, 11. studenog 1918. u 11 sati, primirje nije stupilo na snagu i neprijateljstva su prestala.

The Cijena pobjede

The Cijena pobjede

Ofanziva Sto dana donijela je pobjedu, ali uz veliku cijenu. Saveznički gubici bili su od kolovoza do studenog 1918. oko 700.000. Njemačke žrtve bile su nešto veće i iznosile su oko 760.000.

U početku saveznici nisu očekivali da će ofenzivom okončati rat, ali su konačni napad planirali za proljeće 1919. Međutim, njihov impresivan podvig oružja tijekom Sto dana slomio je duh njemačke vojske i nanio gubitke iz kojih nisu mogli oporavak.


Vojni sukobi slični ili slični bitci kod Amiensa (1918.)

Niz masovnih savezničkih ofenziva koje su okončale Prvi svjetski rat. Počevši od bitke za Amiens (8. - 12. kolovoza) na Zapadnoj fronti, saveznici su potisnuli središnje sile unatrag, poništavajući svoje dobitke od proljetne ofenzive. Wikipedija

Velika njemačka vojna ofenziva tijekom Prvog svjetskog rata koja je započela proljetnu ofenzivu 21. ožujka 1918. Pokrenuta s linije Hindenburg, u blizini Saint-Quentina, u Francuskoj. Wikipedija

Borio se tijekom Prvog svjetskog rata na Zapadnoj fronti od kraja kolovoza do početka rujna, u slivu rijeke Somme. Dio niza uspješnih protuofenziva kao odgovor na njemačku proljetnu ofenzivu, nakon stanke za preraspoređivanje i opskrbu. Wikipedija

Niz njemačkih napada duž Zapadne fronte tijekom Prvog svjetskog rata, koji je počeo 21. ožujka 1918. Poraziti saveznike prije nego što bi Sjedinjene Države mogle u potpunosti rasporediti svoje resurse. Wikipedija

Dio Stodnevne ofenzive Prvog svjetskog rata od strane saveznika protiv njemačkih položaja na Zapadnoj fronti. Nepotpuni dio kanala Canal du Nord i na periferiji Cambraija između 27. rujna i 1. listopada 1918. Wikipedia

Popis snaga uključenih u bitku za Amiens u Prvom svjetskom ratu borio se od 8. kolovoza do 11. kolovoza 1918. Savezničke snage u Amiensu bile su pod vrhovnim zapovjedništvom generala Ferdinanda Focha. Wikipedija

Borbeni red za operaciju Michael, dio njemačke proljetne ofenzive koja se vodila od 21. ožujka do 5. travnja 1918. kao jedan od glavnih angažmana u Prvom svjetskom ratu. Borio se između mješovitih francuskih, britanskih i dominijskih snaga i Wikipedije

Britanska ofenziva na Zapadnoj fronti tijekom Prvog svjetskog rata Od 9. travnja do 16. svibnja 1917. britanske su trupe napale njemačku obranu u blizini francuskog grada Arrasa na Zapadnoj fronti. Wikipedija

Ključna bitka u Prvom svjetskom ratu koja je započela 29. rujna 1918. i uključivala je britanske, australske i američke snage koje su djelovale u sastavu četvrte britanske armije pod sveukupnim zapovjedništvom generala Sir Henryja Rawlinsona. Sjevernije, dio britanske Treće armije također je podržao napad. Wikipedija

Bitka između savezničkih snaga i njemačke vojske, vođena tijekom Stodnevne ofenzive Prvog svjetskog rata. Nakon druge bitke kod Cambraija, saveznici su napredovali gotovo 2 milje i oslobodili francuske gradove Naves i Thun-Saint-Martin. Wikipedija

Bitka između trupa prve, treće i četvrte britanske vojske i snaga Njemačkog carstva tijekom Stodnevne ofenzive Prvog svjetskog rata. Bitka se dogodila u i oko francuskog grada Cambraija, između 8. i 10. listopada 1918. Wikipedia

Bitka u Prvom svjetskom ratu koja se dogodila u Bapaumeu u Francuskoj, od 21. kolovoza 1918. do 3. rujna 1918. Nastavak bitke kod Alberta i također se naziva drugom fazom te bitke. Wikipedija

Druga bitka kod Villers-Bretonneux (također Akcije Villers-Bretonneux, nakon prvih bitki na Sommi, 1918.) dogodila se od 24. do 27. travnja 1918., tijekom njemačke proljetne ofenzive istočno od Amiensa. Znameniti po tome što je to bila prva prilika u kojoj su se tenkovi međusobno borili, bila je to najveća i najuspješnija tenkovska akcija njemačke vojske u Prvom svjetskom ratu. Wikipedija

Bitka u Prvom svjetskom ratu koju su vodile vojske Britanskog Carstva i Francuske Treće Republike protiv Njemačkog Carstva. Održalo se između 1. srpnja i 18. studenoga 1916. s obje strane gornjeg toka rijeke Somme u Francuskoj. Wikipedija

Bitka između trupa prve i treće britanske vojske i snaga Njemačkog carstva tijekom Stodnevne ofenzive Prvog svjetskog rata. Radnja se dogodila u i oko belgijske općine Honnelles, između 5. i 7. studenog 1918. Wikipedia

Britanska vojska tijekom Prvog svjetskog rata vodila je najveći i najskuplji rat u svojoj dugoj povijesti. Činili su ga isključivo volonteri - za razliku od ročnika - na početku sukoba. Wikipedija

Uspješan napad pješaštva australske vojske i američke vojske, uz podršku britanskih tenkova, na njemačke položaje u i oko grada Le Hamel, na sjeveru Francuske, tijekom Prvog svjetskog rata. Planirao i zapovijedao general -potpukovnik John Monash, zapovjednik australskog korpusa . Wikipedija

Kampanja Prvog svjetskog rata, koju su saveznici vodili protiv Njemačkog Carstva. Bitka se vodila na Zapadnom frontu, od srpnja do studenog 1917. godine, za kontrolu grebena južno i istočno od belgijskog grada Ypresa u Zapadnoj Flandriji, u sklopu strategije koju su saveznici odlučili na konferencijama u studenom 1916. i svibnju 1917. godine. . Wikipedia

Saveznički čelnici Prvog svjetskog rata bili su političke i vojne osobe koje su se borile za saveznike ili ih podržavale tijekom Prvog svjetskog rata. Nikola II. - Posljednji ruski car, naslovni kralj Poljske i veliki vojvoda Finske. Wikipedija

Bitka u Prvom svjetskom ratu vodila se 18. rujna 1918., uključujući britansku Četvrtu armiju pod zapovjedništvom generala Henryja Rawlinsona protiv položaja njemačkih uporišta ispred linije Hindenburg. Zarobljena 18. rujna od strane 12. divizije. Wikipedija

O ulozi Douglasa Haiga 1918. Vrhovni zapovjednik britanskih ekspedicijskih snaga (BEF) na Zapadnom frontu. Wikipedija


Posljedica

Bitka kod Amiensa bila je velika prekretnica u tempu rata. Nijemci su započeli rat sa Schlieffen planom prije nego što je Utrka na more usporila kretanje na Zapadnoj fronti i rat se pretvorio u rovovsku borbu. Proljetna njemačka ofenziva ranije te godine ponovno je dala Njemačkoj ofenzivu na Zapadnom frontu. Oklopna podrška pomogla je saveznicima da probiju rupu kroz linije rovova, oslabivši nekada neosvojive položaje rovova. Britanska Treća armija bez oklopne potpore nije imala gotovo nikakav učinak na liniju, dok je Četvrta, s manje od tisuću tenkova, provalila duboko na njemačko područje. Australski zapovjednik John Monash kralj George V. u danima nakon bitke odlikovan je vitezovima.

Britanski ratni dopisnik Philip Gibbs zabilježio je utjecaj Amiensa na tempo rata, rekavši 27. kolovoza da je "neprijatelj u obrani" i da je "inicijativa napada toliko u našim rukama da ga možemo pogoditi mnogo različitih mjesta. " Gibbs također pripisuje Amiensu promjenu morala vojnih snaga, rekavši: "Promjena je bila veća u svijesti ljudi nego u zauzimanju teritorija. S naše strane čini se da je vojska potaknuta golemom nadom da će nastaviti s ovim posao brzo "i to," dolazi i do promjene u neprijateljskom umu. Nemaju više ni mrvu nadu u pobjedu na ovom zapadnom frontu. Sve što se sada nadaju je da će se braniti dovoljno dugo da pregovorima steknu mir. "

PODIJELITE STRANICU!


Svjetski rat je rat koji uključuje mnoge ili većinu najmoćnijih i najmnogoljudnijih zemalja svijeta. Svjetski ratovi zahvaćaju više zemalja na više kontinenata, a bitke se vode u više kazališta. Izraz se primjenjuje na dva velika međunarodna sukoba koja su se dogodila tijekom dvadesetog stoljeća: Prvi i Drugi svjetski rat.


Čelična oluja

Za ljubitelje podcasta, Sir Hew Strachan OVDJE detaljno pregledava bitku kod Amiensa.

Rob Thompson je također napisao rad za Udruga Zapadni front o planiranju bitke i logističkim izazovima kliknite OVDJE za PDF rada.

Ima tu puno toga za zube!

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Komentari

Zaista lijepo, je li ta mreža n 8 x 6 Ako je tako, je li to standard za kvadratno udaranje i tko radi te brojke. Kopiranje ovoga i na web mjesto Wargames. Hvala vam što ste ovo objavili, sviđaju mi ​​se rešetke i ovo je vrlo različito.

Hvala Norm, odgovorio sam na TWW -u, ali u slučaju da to još netko čita: rešetke su 6 & quot kvadrata na ploči 4 x 3 ft, što je standardna veličina Square Bashinga. Sve figure su iz Petera Svinje, osim dva tenka iz ekspanzije PSC -a Great War!


Korištenje bežične veze u bitci za Amiens 8. - 11. kolovoza 1918

Disertacija poslana kao dio zahtjeva za stupanj magisterija na britanskim studijama Prvog svjetskog rata na Sveučilištu u Birminghamu. Ovaj rad osvojio je nagradu WFA -e za najbolju disertaciju 2013. koja je dodijeljena na konferenciji predsjednika WFA -e 2014. godine.

Uvod

  • Poglavlje 1 Signali Inteligencija: Planovi tajnosti i obmane
  • Poglavlje 2 Korištenje bežične veze sa kopnenim snagama
  • Poglavlje 3 Korištenje bežične veze s Kraljevskim zračnim snagama
  • Zaključak
  • Bibliografija

Kratice

  • ADM Admiralitet.
  • AFA australska terenska artiljerija.
  • AIR Ministarstvo zračnog prometa.
  • AWM Australian War Memorial, Canberra.
  • BEF Britanske ekspedicijske snage.
  • Službenik osoblja CBSO -ove šalterske baterije.
  • Teška artiljerija kanadskog korpusa CCHA.
  • CW kontinuirani val.
  • Glavni stožer GHQ -a (BEF -a).
  • Glavni zapovjednik GOC -a.
  • Sjedište sjedišta.
  • IWM Imperial War Museum, London.
  • LHCMA Liddle Hart Centar za vojne arhive, London.
  • Nacionalni arhiv NAC -a Kanade, Ottawa.
  • O.A.D Službena vojna depeša.
  • ILI Ostali činovi.
  • RA Kraljevska artiljerija.
  • RAI Royal Artillery Institute, London.
  • R.A.F. Kraljevsko zrakoplovstvo
  • Kraljevska poljska artiljerija RFA.
  • RFC Royal Flying Corps.
  • Nacionalni arhiv TNA, London.
  • WT bežična telegrafija.
  • WO Ratni ured.

Uvod

Među povjesničarima postoji opći konsenzus da je bitka kod Amiensa označila početak kraja na Zapadnoj fronti tijekom Prvog svjetskog rata. [1] Cilj ove disertacije je ispitati ulogu i doprinos bežične komunikacije uspjehu britanskih ekspedicijskih snaga (u daljnjem tekstu BEF) u četiri dana od 8. do 11. kolovoza 1918. godine.

Značaj Amiensa i bežične komunikacije

Unatoč gore spomenutom konsenzusu, britanski službeni povjesničar, brigadni general Sir James Edmonds, mišljenja je da je uspjeh postignut u Amiensu samo 'ono što bi Nijemci nazvali običnom pobjedom'. [2] Edmonds je pojasnio ovu izjavu objasnivši da, iako Amiens nije bila strateška pobjeda, ipak je njemačkoj vojsci zadao odlučujući udarac u njihov moral, što je rezultiralo gubitkom vjere u konačnu pobjedu. [3] Međutim, vjerojatno je točnije reći da je Amiens pogoršao pad morala u njemačkoj vojsci, pad koji je započeo u razdoblju nakon neuspjelih ožujskih ofenziva. [4] To potvrđuje general Erich Ludendorff koji je, iako je 8. kolovoza nazvao 'Crnim danom njemačke vojske', vjerovao da je prethodni gubitak discipline i borbene sposobnosti bio glavni uzrok kolapsa. [5] Ovaj gubitak discipline svakako je bio očit u Amiensu, čija se mjera može dobiti prema broju zarobljenika koje je uzela BEF. Više neprijateljskih trupa zarobljeno je u šest dana od 6. kolovoza do 12. kolovoza nego u prethodnih devet mjeseci zajedno. [ 6] Amiens je stoga njemačkoj vojsci zadao odlučujući udarac i kao rezultat toga 8. kolovoza zaslužuje naslov koji je skovao Charles Messenger: 'Dan kada smo pobijedili u ratu'. [7]

Paddy Griffith je tvrdio da je neuspjeh komunikacije na Zapadnom frontu bio ograničavajući faktor u postizanju odlučnog proboja. [8] Iako Amiens nije bio bitka za izbijanje, to je ipak bio uspješan proboj tijekom kojeg je komunikacija igrala važnu ulogu. Mjera ove važnosti može se dobiti iz statističkih podataka koji se odnose na telegrafski promet Četvrte armije, a koji pokazuju da je od 8. do 11. kolovoza u prosjeku dnevno rukovano 6100 telegrafa. [9] Nije dostupna nikakva analiza ovih podataka, ali je vjerojatno da je većinu vodila zemaljska i ožičena kabelska mreža, a ne bežična. [10] Međutim, od povlačenja u ožujku bilo je poznato da je bežična veza bitno sredstvo komunikacije u mobilnom ratovanju. [11] Slijedom toga, početkom ljeta 1918. donesene su brojne mjere kako bi se prisilila integracija ove tehnologije u standardnu ​​politiku signalizacije. To je uključivalo dodjelu određenih dana koji će se koristiti samo za bežične komunikacije i dana vježbanja za simulaciju uporabe bežične veze u mobilnom ratovanju. [12] Amiens je bila prva prava prilika da se utvrdi je li to novootkriveno povjerenje u bežičnu vezu opravdano.

Historiografija

Iako je uspjeh u Amiensu na kraju doveo do pobjede na zapadu, ovo razdoblje Prvog svjetskog rata je čudno zanemareno, Britanci se radije sjećaju 'blata i krvi' iz bitaka 1916. i 1917. [13] Jonathan Boff pokazao je da se ta kultura proteže i na povjesničare u tome što su 24 djela vojne povijesti objavljena na 90. obljetnicu bitke na Sommi u usporedbi sa samo četiri na 90. godišnjicu 'Sto dana'. [14] Jedno od najočitijih objašnjenja za ovaj nedostatak povijesnih djela je gotovo morbidna fascinacija tragedijom rata, ali Sydney Wise sugerira da su britanski povjesničari izbjegli ovo razdoblje zbog njegove dominacije uspjehom Dominiona. [15] Prvi je vjerojatniji od drugog. Ipak postoje brojna mjerodavna djela, posebno vezana uz razdoblje Sto dana, od kojih je možda najodlučniji Priča o četvrtoj armiji general bojnika Sir Archibalda Montgomeryja. [16] Ovo djelo napisano je iz jedinstvene osobne perspektive s autorom koji ima privilegiran pristup mnoštvu izvornih dokumenata i kao takav bogat je operativnim detaljima. Međutim, izrazito nedostaju detalji u pogledu komunikacije i signalizacije. Novija sekundarna djela nisu ništa bolja u tom pogledu, primjeri su Amiens primirju i Dan kada smo pobijedili u ratu. [17] Na primjer, potonji ne spominje rad balona zmajeva ili topničkih zrakoplova, koji su obojicu u bitnoj upotrebi koristili u borbi, to je unatoč poglavlju posvećenom zračnim operacijama. [18] Iznenađujuće, slična kritika može se izreći u Službenoj povijesti R.A.F. tijekom Prvog svjetskog rata. [19] Tri nacionalne službene povijesti također sadrže oskudnu referencu u pogledu bežične veze, ima ih svega 10 ukupno tri britanske, tri australske i četiri kanadske. [20] Ovo posljednje ulazi u razumnu količinu detalja u vezi s planom prijevare u Amiensu, što je tema Poglavlja 1, ali pruža malo informacija o bežičnom aspektu plana. [21] Opsežna povijest rada Signalne službe napisana je 1921. godine i donedavno je to djelo ostalo mjerodavan tekst. Međutim, njegova staccato priča otežava čitanje, a Paddy Griffith ga je opisao kao 'pozitivno najneprobojniju knjigu ikad napisanu o ratu'. [22] Izrazito modernija i čitljivija studija je Brian Hall's Ph.D. teza o komunikacijama, za koju Jonathan Boff sugerira da će zamijeniti Priestleyjevu i postati 'standardno djelo'. [23] Iako ovo djelo sadrži poglavlje od 20 stranica o komunikacijama u bitci za Amiens, u kojem se o bežičnoj komunikaciji govori detaljno, ne postoji mjerenje njezine važnosti tijekom bitke. [24] Hallov kasniji rad, posvećen bežičnim komunikacijama, opisuje 'krivulju učenja' u odnosu na važnost bežične veze za mobilnu bitku i njezinu održivost kao alternativu kabelu. [25] Ograničenje ovog djela je to što je opsežno i stoga se ne može zadržati na pojedinim radnjama ili angažmanima. Amiens se samo kratko spominje u širem kontekstu Sto dana.

Primarni izvori

Većina materijala korištenog u ovoj disertaciji sadržana je u raznim ratnim dnevnicima Nacionalnog arhiva u Londonu. Međutim, u tim zapisima postoji nekoliko praznina, od kojih su najveće povezane s bežičnim grupama za promatranje, školama signala i razbijanjem koda potonje, od 2530 datoteka sačuvano je samo 25. [26] Osim toga, preostao je samo jedan dnevnik iz vojnih signalnih škola, a samo jedan iz bežičnih promatračkih skupina odnosi se na kazalište Bliski istok i ne sadrži nikakve korisne informacije. [27] Osobni papiri i memoari bili su korisni, iako postoji izrazit nedostatak memoara u odnosu na bežično osoblje. [28]

This dissertation will attempt to measure the effectiveness of wireless during the battle by analysis of three main subjects each with its own chapter. Chapter 1 will examine the importance of signals intelligence to the secrecy plan and what contribution it made to the fundamental objective of maintaining the element of surprise. The British Official History refers to this element of surprise as 'the essence of the Allied success'.[29] The key questions to be addressed in this chapter therefore are first, how important was the element of surprise to the overall success of the battle and second, what part did wireless play in maintaining the element of surprise? In order to answer these questions the secrecy plan will be broken down into three component parts namely the feint at Kemmel in Flanders, the feint at Arras, and the measures taken on the Fourth Army front at Amiens.

Chapter 2 will focus on a the use of wireless by the ground forces, including infantry, artillery, tanks, as well as ancillary formations such as the field survey companies. One of the key objectives of this chapter is to provide information that can assist in determining whether there is a relationship between combat effectiveness and the use of wireless. The initial problem is to determine which troops were the most combat effective. The Dominion troops gained a reputation as elite troops on the Western Front and this reputation was reinforced by Sir James Edmonds who believed that the Australian and Canadian officers and n.c.o's demonstrated superior leadership qualities in relation to their British counterparts.[30]Peter Simkins suggests that Edmonds criticism of British junior leadership is unjustified and has launched a convincing defence of British divisions.[31] Simkins cites the average success rate in opposed attacks for the nine British divisions who served in Fourth Army during the Hundred Days as 70.7 per cent.[32] This is identical to the figure for the five Australian divisions and similar to that of the four Canadian divisions, the latter achieving 72.5 per cent.[33] This comparative study of the combat performance of the British and Dominion divisions in Fourth Army will be mirrored with respect to the use of wireless in this dissertation. One of the problems faced in compiling this chapter was the paucity of primary sources in relation to the British divisions that took part at Amiens. This is in complete contrast to the Canadian and Australian records that contain a wealth of detailed information, which makes a comparison difficult. The key questions to be addressed in this chapter are first, to what extent was wireless used with the ground forces at Amiens, second, how does the use of wireless compare between the Dominion and British divisions and third, how important was wireless in the overall communications scheme.

Chapter 3 will examine the use wireless by the R.A.F., specifically aircraft and kite balloons. These balloons have received little attention from historians despite being a key component of the artillery counter battery function as well important gatherers of intelligence both at a tactical and operation level. This chapter will show that balloons were actually responsible for the neutralisation of more hostile batteries by wireless than dedicated artillery aircraft during the battle. This is despite the fact that artillery aircraft had been using wireless extensively since 1917 as Bidwell and Graham have observed:

By 1917, as 90 per cent of counter battery observation was done by airmen using wireless, the success of the artillery battle had come to depend on the weather being suitable for flying, on wireless reception and on a network of telephone lines from the receivers to the users of the airmen's information.[34]

The key questions that will be examined in this chapter are first, to what extent was wireless used with the air forces and second how important were these wireless equipped craft to the overall effectiveness of the artillery function.

In summary this dissertation will add to the historiography of both the Battle of Amiens and communications by examining the use of wireless in the most decisive battle of the First World War. Tim Travers has argued that technology was more important than tactics when it came to the combination of arms in 1918 this is perhaps going too far but there is little doubt that technology when used correctly is important in warfare.[35] This dissertation will show that the BEF was using new technology such as wireless to good effect and attempting to integrate it into an evolving weapons system. It will also show that wireless was a useful but not essential component of that system.

Chapter 1

Signals Intelligence: The plans for secrecy and deception

On 17 July 1918 General Sir Henry Rawlinson, GOC Fourth Army, wrote to GHQ outlining his proposals for the offensive and emphasizing the importance of secrecy:

The success of the operation will depend to a very great extent, as was the case on the 4th July, on effecting a complete surprise. Secrecy, in my opinion, is therefore, of vital importance and must be the basis on which the whole scheme is built up.[36]

The measures used to bring about surprise form the basis of the discussion in this chapter, particularly with respect to wireless. In addition, an attempt will be made to determine how effective these measures were and what contribution they made to the overall success of the operation.

The plan to bring about surprise at Amiens was highly complex but the majority of its components were encapsulated in three operational documents, two of which were issued by GHQ and one by Fourth Army.[37] At this stage of the war GHQ was exercising much more control over matters of operational security and pursuing a 'definite policy' of misleading the enemy.[38] The plan was essentially in three parts, namely preparations for a feint attack at Kemmel, preparations for a feint attack at Arras and finally, matters pertaining to general operational security. An overview of these plans can be seen in the charts below.

The Kemmel feint was not only aimed at deliberately misleading the enemy as to the location of a potential offensive but more importantly, it was designed to camouflage the movement of Canadian Corps from Arras to Amiens. With a fighting strength of 118,000 men the Canadian Corps was the largest Corps in the BEF and they were well known to the Germans as attacking troops.[39] As Rawlinson noted shortly after the battle: 'wherever the Canadian Corps was identified by the enemy, he would certainly expect an early offensive'.[40]

Diagram 1.1: The Kemmel Plan

This plan, issued on 27 July, involved the Canadian and Tank wireless sets along with their respective operators, two Canadian infantry battalions, and two Canadian casualty clearing stations, all being relocated from First Army to Second Army.[41] In addition the R.A.F. was ordered to make arrangements with Second Army for occupation of additional aerodromes and to steadily increase aerial activity on this front up to two days before the battle.[42] The object of these arrangements was:

. to give colour to a plan for the interpolation of the Canadian Corps into the line with a view to delivering an attack. The wireless stations will operate and the Battalions be put into the line.[43]

It was hoped that this would give the impression of an advanced party paving the way for the imminent arrival of the whole Canadian Corps and to make this seem more convincing false movement orders were issued on 28 July.[44] The historian S.F. Wise has commented that the measures of deception used to hide the movement of the Canadian Corps are well known.[45] This is not strictly correct as although many abridged accounts have appeared in historical works they tend to be based almost entirely on information contained within the Official Histories, are lacking in detail and contain a number of inaccuracies. For example, Tim Travers incorrectly states that when the Canadian Corps moved to Fourth Army they disguised their move by 'leaving their radio units behind'.[46] The source of this inaccuracy is probably Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson who, in an uncharacteristic misquote of the Canadian Official History, state that 'dummy wireless stations were set up at Arras'.[47] The Canadian Official History correctly places these dummy wireless stations in Flanders.[48] However, it is not only the location of the wireless stations that is incorrectly cited but also details of the actual units that took part. For instance, Shane Schreiber states that these units were the Canadian Corps wireless section they were however divisional units as instructed in the operational orders.[49] Some confusion on this point is justified though as it is difficult to extract a definitive answer from the war diaries regarding exactly which units were involved. The diary of the 1 Canadian Divisional Signal Company states that orders were received from First Army on 30 July to send the headquarters wireless set, along with wireless operators, to Flanders and that X Corps took receipt later that day.[50] The 1 Canadian Division's after action report confirms this but adds that it was the wireless sets of all four Canadian divisions that were sent north to Second Army.[51] However, there is no mention of this in the respective war diaries of those other divisions. Further confusion arises as a result of an entry in the GHQ war diary, which contains an instruction to Second Army, dated 2 August to immediately return the 2 Canadian Divisional wireless sets to Fourth Army.[52] This diary though makes no mention of any other Canadian divisional sets, including those of 1 Canadian Division.[53] This leaves two possible explanations, either one of the GHQ or 1 Canadian Division war diaries could be in error, or both the 1 Canadian and 2 Canadian divisional sets were sent and the GHQ instruction regarding the 1 Canadian divisional set was either omitted or not required. The latter is the most likely as the original instruction to send the wireless sets to Second Army asked for 'two Canadian Divisional Wireless Sets'.[54] The Director of Second Army Signals war diary does record receipt of two wireless sets from First Army but erroneously gives the date of receipt as the 25 July, which is two days before the initial instruction from GHQ was sent out.[55] Further weight is added to the wireless sets being from both the 1 and 2 Divisional Signal Companies as both of their war diaries make specific reference to X Corps on consecutive days. Although the diary of the 2 Divisional Signal Company does not make reference to a wireless set being dispatched it does record that a visit was made to X Corps on 29 July by its commanding officer as well as one other officer.[56]

The final inaccuracy with regard to the movement of the Canadian divisional wireless sets and their operators concerns what happened to them after arrival in Second Army. Daniel Dancocks suggests that they were assigned to Sydney Lawford's 41 Division but examination of that division's war diary reveals that it was American and not Canadian wireless personnel that were attached to that division on 29 July.[57] Evidence in support of these men being American is compelling due to the fact that the Second Army war diary records four battalions of American infantry beginning their attachment to 41 Division and 6 Division on 26 July.[58] Furthermore 41 Division was allocated to XIX Corps and not X Corps. As neither the X Corps war diaries nor its associated divisional war diaries contain any reference to the Canadians and their wireless sets, their attachment within Second Army remains a point of conjecture. Once established with Second Army it is not entirely clear what messages the Canadians sent, to whom they were sent and in what format they were sent. Regarding the latter, once again there is an ambiguity as Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Currie, GOC Canadian Corps, wrote that the messages were sent 'worded so as to permit the enemy to decipher the identity of the senders' whereas an after action report draft narrative states they were sent 'in clear'.[59] The latter would probably have raised too much suspicion, as the Germans were well aware that the BEF only sent messages in clear in emergencies.[60] One of the most likely methods that could have been used by the Canadian signallers to allow their identity to be discovered would have been to have reverted back to the insecure call sign system that had been replaced in First Army in May 1918. This system identified a formation by three letters such that the letters "AUO" would represent the Australian Corps and the "CAO" the Canadian Corps.[61] In addition, it would have been possible for the Germans to identify these units by the wavelength they employed. This had been recognised by GHQ by 5 August 1918 who were working on a system to allot new wavelengths although this was not done in time for the battle.[62]

The tank wireless sets were supplied by the 1 Tank Brigade Signal Company, whose war diary records that on 1 August 'Lt Mainprize and 10 OR's were sent for special wireless duty in Second Army area'.[63] Despite the fact that these men were performing this 'special duty' for nine days before returning to their unit very little information is available regarding the exact nature of their work. The British Official History simply records that 'great activity was exhibited by the wireless stations of First and Second Army on the tank wavelength which was well known to the Germans'.[64]

As the orders in Second Army area were being enacted a simultaneous plan was being put into effect on the front of First Army in the region of Arras.

Diagram 1.2: The Arras plan

The instructions contained in the Annexure to O.A.D 900/1 regarding this part of the deception plan read:

Every effort will be made by the First Army to foster the belief, which appears to exist, that an attack is imminent in the ARRAS sector.[65]

To assist this effort, on 27 July the First Army was instructed to make arrangements for one cavalry wireless set to be operated behind the Arras front.[66] Additionally, the wireless sets of the reserve divisions of First Army, together with those of the Second and Third Armies, were instructed to be setup and operated behind their respective fronts whilst wireless activity on all other fronts was ordered to cease.[67] The cavalry orders were changed on 30 July when instructions were given that only in the event of a relocation of the Cavalry Corps headquarters would the Corps wireless station be moved to First Army area.[68] Despite these instructions they were never implemented and instead the Cavalry Corps wireless duty station was simply dismantled under orders from GHQ and did not begin operating again until 2.30 a.m. on the morning of 8 August.[69] This change is probably due to GHQ realising that a silent wireless station could be just as useful as a dummy station with respect to the falsification of signals traffic. Two other activities were taking place within First Army front to complete the deception plan on this front. Firstly, a tank battalion was instructed to carry out manoeuvres in broad daylight as if in preparation for an attack, and secondly, Currie was busying himself with false plans for a feint in the Orange Hill area near Arras. This feint was first proposed by Currie at a conference with Rawlinson on 21 July and was as much about convincing Canadian troops of an impending attack as it was about convincing the Germans.[70] The next day, on the 22 July, he outlined the dummy plans to his divisional commanders and, according to the Canadian Corps CBSO, Lt. Colonel Andrew Macnaughton, gave a very convincing performance.[71]

Finally, a series of general security measures were implemented prior to the opening of the offensive on 8 August these were designed to maximise the element of surprise. They included dispensing with the preliminary barrage and instead relying on accurate survey techniques and the mass use of tanks, the engine noise of which being cloaked by low flying aircraft, minimising unusual activity near the front line and pasting a notice in the men's pay books ordering them to 'keep their mouth's shut'.[72] Even the lie of the country favoured a surprise attack with its covered approaches.[73]

Diagram 1.3: The general secrecy measures at Amiens

Additionally, in July 1918, the wireless security measures adopted by the British Armies in France were revised and improved. The improvements involved the use of 'silent days' and an overhaul of the wireless call signs used by all formations. A 'silent day' was usually a 12-24 hour period within which the use of field telephones, power buzzers and wireless was strictly forbidden. It was well known that any abnormal communications silence or activity, particularly with respect to wireless was a 'sure sign' that an offensive was impending.[74] Silent days were therefore an attempt to obfuscate the conclusions that would otherwise be drawn from listening in to the BEF's signals activity. John Ferris suggests that these periods of silence were random but it seems much more likely that they were deliberately planned, particularly with respect Amiens.[75] For example, the war diary of 30 Division records only three silent days for the whole of 1918 and these occurred on 24 July, 1 August and 10 August. The 30 Division was part of X Corps during this period and although there is no record of silent days in that formation's war diary a wireless operator in 30 Division confided to his personal diary that 24 July was a 'silent day for the corps'.[76] It would therefore seem probable that 1 and 10 August would also have applied to the whole corps. The three silent dates fall just before, and during the Battle of Amiens, and given that X Corps were located within Second Army, who were the hosts of a wireless deception plan with respect to the Canadian Corps, this would seem to suggest that these days were part of a carefully orchestrated plan.

In addition to the silent days the system of calls signs underwent a radical change beginning in May 1918 when, according to a captured German document, four letter codes were introduced to identify units.[77] This same document also states that the Germans had succeeded in penetrating this system by July 1918 after which call signs were changed daily these statements are quoted by John Ferris in his 1988 journal article.[78] A significant proportion of Ferris's article is based on this document, however the latter is fundamentally flawed for two reasons. First, what happened in May was not the introduction of four letter codes but rather the frequency of change became daily instead of bi-monthly, and second, in July it was not the daily change that was introduced but a much higher level of security through encryption of the call signs.[79] As a result, the statement that the Germans succeeded in 'penetrating this system' lacks credibility, as the system they claimed to penetrate was not the one in existence.[80] The conclusion that the Germans were not successful in penetrating the system of daily call sign changes is supported by another translated document, dated 1 August, from the German 51 Corps that noted 'a striking improvement has lately taken place in the telephone and wireless discipline of our enemies'.[81] This general tightening of wireless signals security ultimately helped facilitate the element of surprise at Amiens. How effective though were the other wireless deception measures at Kemmel and Arras and did they also succeed in their objective?

According to Sir Arthur Currie, when the offensive at Amiens was launched on 8 August the surprise was 'complete and overwhelming'.[82] Prisoners from four separate divisions, captured by the Australians early on 8 August, also stated that the attack had been a 'complete surprise'.[83] This is not entirely true as a number of prisoners captured on 8 August testified that two factors had led them to believe that an attack was expected, although not imminent these factors were an increase in air activity and movement behind the lines.[84] The latter had been a concern of 2 Canadian Division who, prior to the battle reported:

. a very large movement by day of heavy artillery and ammunition lorries. Although the visibility from the air was poor, it was certain that some of this movement was observed by the enemy.[85]

In addition, on 4 August the German Oberste-Heeresleitung reported that two Canadian divisions previously on the Arras front had been replaced and that this required particular attention to be paid to the fronts of the British Third and Fourth Armies.[86] A certain amount of suspicion was also raised by the communications silence that had preceded the attack.[87] It is interesting that no mention was made of the British Second Army front despite the fact that the Germans had established the presence of Canadian troops in Flanders.[88] The Australian Official History states that it was only the presence of Canadian Wireless and not infantry that was detected in Flanders, although the source of this assertion is unclear.[89] Ernst Kabisch states that both the presence of the two Canadian battalions and their wireless sets were detected, as does the German Official History.[90] Despite this the German Army staff did not update their situation maps, which, on the morning of 8 August, still showed the four Canadian divisions, clustered around Arras.[91] It is unlikely that this was as a result of the Orange Hill feint, it is probably more the result of incomplete intelligence confirming that the entire divisions had moved. The result of all of this uncertainty was that the German staff were confused, but not convinced enough by the deception plans to change their troop dispositions.[92] However, the uncertainty combined with the other secrecy measures was enough to give the offensive at Amiens a high degree of surprise, even if that surprise was not total. Prior and Wilson argue that the deception plans served only one purpose and that was that the Germans did not move their artillery positions.[93] They also argue that not enough time would have been available to improve the poor state of the defences and adding more troops to the front line would simply have increased the number of casualties.[94] Regarding the first point, the Germans did actually move their artillery positions back eight days before the battle as a direct result of the Australian raid on 29 July.[95] This made very little difference as 95 per cent of the German guns were still located prior to the battle.[96] The latter point regarding adding of troops is somewhat moot as the Germans would have been more likely to bring in Eingreif divisions as their defensive doctrine was based on elastic defence in depth which called for a weakly held front line and counter attack troops in the rear.[97]

Two Canadian authors have opined that the deception plans were a major factor in the success on 8 August.[98] These plans do appear to have at least confused the Canadian troops according to an entry in Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig's diary dated 7 August, which reads:

The move of some Canadian battalions and casualty clearing stations to our Second Army front seems to have quite misled the Canadian troops and many spoke of the "coming offensive to retake Kemmel"![99]

The evidence suggests though that the Germans were more confused than deceived by these plans. The wireless stations in Flanders do seem to have come to the attention of the Germans, even more so than the two infantry battalions according to the Australian Official History, which suggests that wireless did make a significant contribution to this confusion. Other wireless security measures such as the new system of wireless call signs, the introduction of wireless 'silent days' and instructions to the Canadian Corps not to open wireless stations before zero simply added to this confusion.[100] The result was that German intelligence did not detect the relocation of the Canadian Corps from Arras to Amiens.[101] This was the decisive factor in the surprise at Amiens.

Chapter 2

The use of wireless with the ground forces

This chapter will discuss the extent to which wireless was used by the ground forces during the Battle of Amiens. In order to facilitate this discussion, two questions will be posed namely did the Dominion divisions use wireless to a greater extent than the Imperial divisions and how did the use of wireless as a communications medium compare with other forms of communication during the battle?

The official signals policy that applied at the Battle of Amiens was laid down eight months before in the training pamphlet S.S 191.[102] This recommended that in the case of a move from static to open warfare each advancing division should make use of 'as many means of transmission as circumstances will admit'.[103] It was recognised that it would not always be possible to connect divisional communication routes by telephone and therefore suggested a number of alternatives such as visual signalling, portable wireless sets, mounted orderlies and message carrying rockets.[104] Emphasis was placed on restoring telephone communications as soon as possible. Wireless though was a new science and, as John Terraine observed, was not a habit carried over from civilian life.[105] This made the staff reluctant to adopt wireless, despite the official endorsement in the training pamphlets in addition, the certainty of buried telephone cables in static conditions had created an air of complacency. Since 1 April 1916 orders had been issued that cable must be buried to a minimum depth of six feet in order to ensure immunity from a 5.9-inch shell.[106] This reluctance persisted up to the Battle of Amiens as evidenced by an after action report from the 4 Canadian Signal Division:

In stationary trench warfare seven foot buried cable has made the telephone service so certain that all other methods of communication have become superfluous and it is only the keenest optimism that has maintained the efficiency of such alternatives as wireless, visual and cable wagons.[107]

Attempts had been made, during the early summer months, to encourage the use of visual signalling and wireless by the use of what became known as 'silent days'.[108] These days were the complete antithesis of those mentioned in the previous chapter in so far as they only allowed the use of wireless and visual, the use of the telephone and telegraph being strictly forbidden. Unfortunately these days were not always successful as recorded by an artillery officer in the 1 Canadian Divisional Artillery.[109] There were also significant inherent problems with wireless. These included a lack of trained operators, susceptibility to jamming, heavy weight of sets, conspicuous aerials and the problem of enciphering and deciphering each message.[110] Despite these problems wireless technology was improving rapidly in 1918 and this resulted in greater confidence in the medium. For instance the 1917 pattern 'spark' trench set, which became available in large numbers in 1918, was capable of transmitting on 16 wavelengths instead of just two.[111] A Canadian Corps wireless intelligence report suggests that by August 1918 the BEF's wireless technology was one year ahead of the Germans who had been suffering from material shortages.[112]

However, the use of wireless at corps, division and brigade level varied tremendously at Amiens as shown in the table below.

Table 2.1: The use of wireless between infantry formations


BATTLE OF AMIENS 1918, and Operations 8th August-3rd Sept 1918.

BATTLE OF AMIENS 1918, and Operations 8th August-3rd September, 1918.' by Lt Col Kearsey.

First published in 1950 this book is a reprint of that edition. This is one of a series of studies on campaigns and battles of the Great War by Lt Col Kearsey, designed to help the student of military history, particularly those studying for Staff College. Sub-titled
‘The Turn of the Tide on the Western Front' the book examines the offensive
that marked the beginning of the end for Germany.

The Australians with their Canadian comrades, launched on the 8 August 1918, the Battle of Amiens the great offensive that was to bring the war to a victorious end.

Setting out from the positions of Villers-Bretonneux and Hamel, the Australian troops in two hours had accomplished all their objectives, and the Canadian troops who had begun
the attack alongside them had advanced several kilometres. In just over 3 hours,
the enemy's front line had been overrun. In total, the Allied forces captured
29,144 prisoners, 338 guns, and liberated 116 towns and villages. Ludendorff,
the German commander, famously called the 8th August "the black day of the German
Army"


Australian infantry move forward

Australian infantry and pioneers move forward on 8 August 1918. The foggy conditions, which helped the attackers to surprise the Germans, are very obvious and the cameraman noted “the foggy weather made it impossible to get a connected story of good quality film”.

These, together with the British III Corps, were supported by more than 2,000 guns from the Royal Artillery, over 500 tanks from the Tank Corps and over 1,900 aircraft from the Royal Air Force and its French equivalent.


Battle of Amiens, August 10, 1918

Saturday We were up this a.m. at 5 o’c and moved about 12 miles up the line tis a great day am well, (11:20 a.m.) After a forced march this a.m. we pulled into action after a hurried lunch about 400 yds from the front line After an advance of 12 miles we were stopped by machine gun nest


Today’s reports are not particularly consistent, but the general outline is clear. At 1:30 this morning the 5 th Canadian Divisional Artillery is ordered forward in support of an attack by the 32 nd Division, (1) a British division which has been attached since yesterday to the Canadian Corps and is about to move forward to take the place of the 3 rd Canadian Division. (2) The 32 nd ’s artillery have been delayed because of German bombing last night. (2) The brigade leaves its camp near Dromart at dawn to be in a positions of readiness near Beaufort by late morning Percy has enough time to jot in his diary after a hurried lunch they go into action “on the run, kits and equipment flying in all directions.” (3) They are close to the front lines, too close, in fact, within machine-gun range, and only 700 yards behind the front-line infantry. Since the infantry are being held up by those machine guns, the battery retires to a position beside a stretch of disused trench, to the east of Folies. (3,1)

Why this happened is unclear: The 13 th Brigade officers say they were too close because they received wrong information from the 32 nd Division (1) much later, Nicholson, Canada’s official historian of the Great War, says that “by some misfortune the 32 nd Division jumped off a mile or more short of its assigned start line.” (4) In other words, the Canadians were where they were supposed to be the British weren’t.

I’ll quote again from the 43 rd Battery History: “So you will see that we are not qualified to give the military details of these operations and it remains only to discourse a little concerning the way in which the … fighting affected us, ‘who never could know and could never understand.”’ (5)

Generally the problem, when the infantry are moving quickly (13 km the first day another 6 yesterday), is getting the guns close enough to provide effective cover and wire-cutting. Today, the third day of the Battle of Amiens, the advance is slowing as German resistance is stronger: reinforcements are arriving – four fresh German divisions opposite the Canadians – with replacement guns and deadly machine guns. (6)

And they are now facing each other across land that shows the scars of much earlier fighting, “a belt some three miles wide pitted with shell-holes and the remains of old trenches, and befouled with tangles of rusty barbed wire overgrown with long, concealing grass. There was no lack of good sites for machine-gun posts, and the attackers were quickly to realize that the operation had suddenly reverted from open pursuit almost to the former pattern of trench warfare.” (4)

The infantry are attacking Le Quesnoy, Parvillers and Damery, and make some progress in the morning, but by the afternoon they are stalled, “stopped by machine-gun nest” says Percy. “Nest” is such a cosy word, but we must think of wasps rather than fledglings.

“The villages were alive with machine-gun nests which were used to deadly effect on the allied troops.” (7) The 5 th CDA guns will remain in action all night. (8)

***
The photograph © IWM (Q 9334) shows Canadian 18 pounders going forward. It will be taken about seven weeks from now.

The first map (from the McMaster University Digital Collection) shows Beaufort (A) where the 13th Brigade gathered in readiness, Folies (B) east of which they took up firing positions, and Parvillers-Daméry which are the infantry’s objectives. The second map (from the Canadian War Museum) indicates with purple dots where these locations are in reference to the territory we have been covering since the early morning of August 8th — a long way from that first position near Cachy and from last night’s near Dromart (also marked).


5. The battle was the start of the Hundred Day Offensive, which led to the end of the First World War.

American soldiers on their way to the Hindenburg Line.

After the Battle of Amiens, a fresh offensive began in Albert on August 21 st that ultimately pushed the Germans back 55km. On August 27 th Phillip Gibbs, a British war correspondent stated that the Germany ‘is on the defensive’ and credited Amiens with a change in the morale of the Allied troops, saying the army was geared up with ‘enormous hope.’

Then the Germans were pushed back to the Hindenburg Line, a major defensive point of theirs constructed in the Winter of 1916-1917, and a series of battles were held there before the British army broke through on October 8 th . It was this breach that forced German commanders to face up to the fact that the war had to end. Towards the end of 1918, they retreated through territories they had gained in 1914, and fighting took place up until 11 am on November 11 th , 1918 when the Armistice took effect.

The Hundred Days Offensive saw the tides of fortune turn against Germany in the First World War. From there the fate of the German Army was sealed. After the Battle of Amiens, it was only a matter of time before the war would be over, with Germany on the losing side.


Gledaj video: Огњен Карановић - Српске победе 1918. године пробој Солунског фронта (Srpanj 2022).


Komentari:

  1. Tojamuro

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  3. Bana

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  5. Jonni

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